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Abstract 
Beauquier, J., Two distributed problems involving byzantine processes, Theoretical Computer 
Science 95 (1992) 169-185. 
We present solutions to two classical problems concerning distributed systems in which some 
sites or processes can possibly have byzantine faulty behavior. We first study the naming problem 
(how to give each site of a network a unique identifier). We are naturally led to make some 
supplementary assumptions about the synchrony of message passing, the connectivity of the 
underlying graph and the existence of a special site, provided with a digital signature, for initiating 
the protocol. The solution that we present uses three waves of messages between the initiator and 
any other site. Then, we solve the mutual exclusion problem with particular assumptions about 
the behavior of byzantine processes. The solution implements each critical section as a separate 
segment, whose address (necessary to access it) is “hidden”. A process must reconstruct this 
address before entering its critical section, involving the cooperation of a number of other processes. 
For the two problems, protocols are given and their complexity is estimated. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we will consider two classical problems concerning distributed 
systems, under the assumption that some sites or some processes can possibly have 
a faulty behavior. The first one is the naming problem and the second one the 
mutual exclusion problem. We will briefly present them and discuss about the 
assumptions that we make. 
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Almost all distributed algorithms assume as a precondition that each site has a 
unique identifier. Under usual hypotheses, giving each site an identifier is straightfor- 
ward, even if each site does not know about the entire network. For example, a 
circulating token containing an integer can perform a traversal of the network, 
starting with the value 1, and increasing it by 1, each time it leaves a site for the 
first time [6]. Each site chooses as its unique identifier the integer in the token at 
its first arrival. This method, like some other methods (cf. [4, 111, depends on the 
fact that each site transmits the token and increases its value correctly. If a given 
site decreases the value of the token instead of increasing it, two (correct) sites 
would receive the same identifier. And what about a site keeping the token forever! 
In this paper, we will be interested in the (non-trivial) problem of giving each 
site a unique identifier, assuming that some sites can have byzantine behavior [7]. 
That means that, roughly speaking, the bad sites can perform anything: sending 
false messages or not sending messages at all, having a correct behavior, stopping 
and then restarting, etc. A site that permanently follows its protocol is called correct 
Without some supplementary-rather strong-assumptions, the naming problem 
has no solution. We will not present a formal treatment yielding results of indecidabil- 
ity, but simply describe the wrong situations that can possibly occur. 
Firstly, let us consider the network in Fig. 1. 
If the site s can only communicate with the rest of the network through the 
byzantine site byz, it cannot necessarily distinguish between the situation above and 
the situation in Fig. 2. 
Thus, if a deterministic algorithm for solving the naming problem would exist, it 
would have to give s an identifier independent of those given to the n other sites. 
Then the uniqueness of the identifiers would not be ensured. 
n sites 
Fig. 1 
byz S 
Fig. 2. 
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Such a paradox also appears when a site is “surrounded” by byzantine sites or 
when two or more correct sites cannot communicate without avoiding a byzantine 
one. 
So, we are naturally led to an assumption about the connectivity degree of the 
network. 
Let k be a strict upper bound to the number of possible byzantine processes. We 
will assume that the network is k-connected. That is there are at least k+ 1 disjoint 
paths connecting two correct sites. Among these k+ 1 disjoint paths, at least one 
goes through only correct processes. 
The most general and difficult hypothesis about message passing is asynchrony. 
When the network is not known, asynchrony does not allow to detect the termination 
of an algorithm. We will assume here that each site knows an upper bound to the 
diameter of the network. 
The third assumption concerns asymmetry of the sites. The naming problem has 
no solution even if all sites are correct, if the sites are perfectly symmetrical and, 
therefore, indistinguishable. 
In order to prove that ab absurdo, consider the network of Fig. 3, in which the 
two sites are identical. 
Fig. 3. 
Since the two sites follow the same protocol at the same time, they receive the 
same information from the other and then choose the same identifier. So we will 
assume that there exists a particular site, the initiator, that starts the naming 
algorithm. Each site knows whether it is the initiator or not, and there is a unique 
initiator. We assume that the initiator is always correct and that the messages it 
sends are authenticated. This requirement can be achieved, for instance, by a 
cryptographic digital signature [lo]. 
The problem of the mutual exclusion is another classical problem concerning the 
synchronization of concurrent or distributed processes. Each process is given with 
a special part of its code, called the critical section and a protocol must be designed, 
to ensure that, at any time, at most one process is executing inside its critical section. 
Moreover, the protocol must yield some fairness, absence of starvation and deadlock 
requirements. This problem appears, in particular, when an exclusive access to a 
resource, like a printer, must be imposed. 
In a large network, with a number of host computers, the correctness of all the 
processes running in the network cannot be guaranteed at the same level. For 
instance, processes running on micro-computers or small computers are supposed 
to be less reliable than those on large mainframes, where a control system does 
exist. But the mutual exclusion condition for some access must be guaranteed, 
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whatever the processes do. Some solutions to the problem of mutual exclusion have 
been presented in the case of crash faults [9,3].). But, in contrast with crash faults, 
a faulty byzantine process cannot generally be detected. The difficulty is thus to 
design a protocol that deals with byzantine faults. 
It is not hard to see that such a protocol does not exist for the mutual exclusion 
problem and that supplementary assumptions must be made, in order to obtain 
partial solutions. The main difficulty that we are faced to is: when a correct process 
is executing in its critical section, how can we avoid that a faulty process enters its 
own critical section? The idea for solving it is to use a mechanism analogous to a 
capability. If the critical section is implemented as a separate segment and if the 
access to this segment requires the knowledge of its address, this address should 
be given to any process only under distributed control. In our solution, a process 
wanting to enter its critical section must reconstruct the required address from pieces 
of information sent by the other processes, after they have agreed on him. Schemati- 
cally, the protocol for a process is: 
l ask the other processes for their pieces of information for reconstructing the 
address of the critical section segment, 
l wait until this address can be reconstructed, 
l enter the critical section, then leave it, 
l send acknowledgments to all other processes (the exit section). 
In this paper, we will consider processes that can exhibit byzantine behavior 
everywhere in their code, except during the execution of some special parts of the 
protocol, namely the critical and the exit sections. We will call such processes, as 
in [2], locally byzantine processes. Note that this hypothesis is absolutely necessary 
for avoiding a byzantine process to remain forever in its critical section or not to 
notify its exiting to the other processes. 
2. The naming problem with faulty processes 
2.1. Preliminaries 
Let Gi, 1 <i< n be processes. Assume that every Gi can directly exchange 
messages with some other GJ (its neighbors), that message passing is synchronous 
and that no message is modified or lost. Gi only knows about its neighbors and 
nothing else about the network topology. Assume topology is fixed. 
The naming problem is to design a protocol Pi that G, may use to obtain a unique 
identifier. The protocol P, involves exchanging messages with its neighbors. As long 
as G, computes according to Pi, it is called correct. Once a process G, deviates from 
Pi, it becomes faulty (or byzantine) and is considered to remain faulty, even if, later 
on, it reverts back to following Pt. 
Initially, each site knows its adjacent communication lines and knows them by 
a local name (a number). 
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We also assume that a particular process has the role of initiating the protocols. 
So each process initially knows whether it is the initiator or not. The initiator is 
assumed to be correct. 
At the end, we suppose that there is a public key cryptographic system, allowing 
the initiator to use a digital signature [lo]. Let (T be the digital signature of the 
initiator and a(m) a signed message. 
2.2. The protocol 
We will first sketch how the protocol works. At the beginning, the initiator numbers 
its neighbors and for all numbers i, sends to i the (signed) message cT(“initializa- 
tion”, i). Each neighbor, receiving such a message, checks for the digital signature 
of the initiator (in case of failure, the message is rejected), numbers its own neighbors, 
for each of them concatenates the number to the message, then sends it to the related 
neighbor. Such a message has the form (cT(“initialization”, i),j), where j is the 
neighbor number. In a general manner, we call valid any message endorsed by the 
digital signature of the initiator. During the whole protocol, correct sites only accept 
valid messages. 
When a correct site s receives a valid message, it knows how its neighbor has 
numbered the communication line between them. If this number is j and if s has 
itself numbered the communication line by i, s registers that iC’ = j. If, after this 
first numbering, s receives from the same neighbor conflicting information about 
the number of the line, it simply does not accept any other message from this 
neighbor. 
The first time a correct site s receives a valid message, it starts a watchdog timer, 
initialized to the value 3 * D * 6, where v is the maximum transmission delay between 
two adjacent sites (recall that message passing is synchronous and D is the network 
diameter). 
At this point, it should be noticed that byzantine sites can possibly relay messages 
endorsed by the initiator, after having modified some unencoded information. 
In the sequel, each site receiving a valid initialization message relays it to its 
numbered neighbors, after having appended its number to the message. Moreover, 
each site manages a list, containing the valid messages already received. Each time 
a valid message is accepted, the list is searched to check that the message is not a 
looping message (more precisely, it is searched whether a left prefix of the message 
is already in the list, as a complete message). Looping messages are rejected. So 
correct sites progressively delete valid messages. 
It should be noticed that a correct site can possibly accept and relay a message 
that contains false information. Figure 4 shows such a situation. 
The first byzantine site receives a(“initialization”, 3) from the initiator. It relays 
it to the other byzantine site without change. This one appends 1 and sends the 
message (a(“initialization”, 3), 1) to the correct site. So, s can think that the network 
is as in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 4. 
initiator 
-- r 
Fig. 5. 
Now, we introduce the notion of conjirmation. Each time a site accepts a valid 
message, it returns to the initiator a return message, by the reverse path. For that 
it uses the inverse of the numbers of its outgoing communications lines as registered 
previously, cf. Fig. 6. 
As a matter of fact, the actual reverse path is followed only if the message does 
not go through a byzantine site deviating it. A return message is identical to an 
return 
Fig. 6. 
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initialization message, except that it has a first field “return” (unsigned). A return 
message is relayed by the correct sites toward the initiator and a pointer shows at 
what step the message has arrived. For instance, 
(“return”, cT(“initialization”, 3), 1, 2, 3, 2) 
is a return message that has followed back a line numbered 2-l and a line numbered 
3-l. 
Each time the initiator receives a return message, it erases the fields “return” and 
“initialization”, signs the rest of the message, adds the message in clear with a 
pointer on the first number and a field “confirmation”. For instance, such a confirma- 
tion message is: 
(“confirmation”, a(3, 1,3,3,2), (3, 1, 3,3,2)). 
Then the confirmation message is transmitted by the correct sites, according to the 
included path, until arriving at the destination. At each step, the digital signature 
of the initiator is checked. Moreover, the point is checked and updated, indicating 
at what step the message has arrived. For instance, this is a circulating confirmation 
message: 
(“confirmation”, 43, 1,3,3,2), (3,1,3,& 2)), 
indicating that, from the initiator, the message has followed the lines 3, 1,3 and 3 
and that the destination will be reached by following line 2. When a confirmation 
message arrives at its destination, the site checks the digital signature of the initiator, 
checks whether or not the message is already in its list of valid messages and, if so, 
stores the value of the path in a table. After the delay 3 * D * 6, a correct site stops 
and concatenates in a string all the values of paths that are stored in the table (using 
a separator). Then it chases the result of the concatenation as an identifier. 
Now, we present a more precise formulation of the protocols. Some data structures 
and primitive are presented in Appendix A. The symbol “!” denotes the marked 
catenation of strings (catenation with a marker insertion). 
protocol initiator; 
begin 
(numbering of the neighbors) 
timer (3*D*6); 
for all number i send cT(initialization, i) to (neighbor i); 
upon reception of (return, i !m) send 
(cr(confirmation, i!m), i!m) to (neighbor i); 
upon reception of 
(initialization or confirmation messages) 
do nil; 
upon timer expiration do stop 
end; 
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protocol site; 
begin 
identzjier := empty string; 
(numbering of the neighbors) 
upon reception of (cr(initialization, i), i!m) do 
if (first reception of an initialization message) then 
timer (3*0*6); 
if i!m not in prefix (valid) then 
send (s(init i), i!m.J) to (neighborj); 
valid:=&d+i!m(’ 
send (return, i!m !j,‘i!m) to (neighborj-‘); 
endif 
endo 
upon reception of (return, i!m’!j!k!m”, i!m’!j!h!m”) do 
send (return, i!m’!j!k!m”, i!m’!j!k!m”) to (neighbor k-l); 
endo 
upon reception of (cT(confirmation, m’!j!k!m”), m’!g!k!m”) do 
begin 
send (a(confirmation, m’!j!k!m”), m’!j!h!m’) to (neighbor i); 
if m’!j is in valid then ident:= ident!$m’!j$; 
end 
endo 
upon timer expiration do stop 
endo 
end; 
We now prove that the protocols are correct. All protocols do terminate, since 
the clock interrupts have a finite delay. 
Lemma 1. Any correct process receives at least one initialization message and one 
con$rmation message with the same path information that has only passed through 
correct processes. 
Proof. The graph is k + 1 connected. Then there exist k + 1 disjoint paths leading 
from the initiator to any correct process. Among them, at least one does not contain 
any faulty process (recall that there are at most k faulty processes). 0 
We call normal for Pi any message that has gone only through correct processes 
between the initiator and Pi. Lemma 1 states that any correct process receives normal 
initialization and confirmation messages. Moreover, any message normal for Pi is 
valid for Pi. 
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Lemma 2. Let P, and Pz be two distinct correct processes and let m, and m2 be two 
normal messages, respectively for P, and P2. Then m, and m2 are different. 
Proof. If m, and m2 are equal, that means that the path from the initiator to P, is 
the same as the path from the initiator to P2, since m, and m, are relayed only by 
correct processes. So P, and P2 cannot be distinct. 0 
Lemma 3. Let P, and P2 be two distinct correct processes and let m be a normal 
message for P, . Then m cannot be a valid message of P2. 
Proof. By Lemma 2, m cannot be a normal message for Pz. Thus, if m is a valid 
message for Pz, it has been relayed by a faulty process. But, since m is a normal 
message for P, it only transits through correct processes. 0 
Lemma 4. Two distinct correct processes accept (at least) two distinct valid messages. 
Proof. By Lemma 1 each of them accepts at least one normal message and by 
Lemma 3, such a message is not valid for the other. 0 
Theorem 5. Ai the end of the protocols, two distinct correct processes have distinct 
identifiers. 
Proof. Since the identifier consists of the concatenation of valid messages separated 
by a marker, they differ, by Lemma 4, by at least one message. 0 
2.3. Complexity 
Let m be the maximum degree of the graph (maximum number of outgoing lines 
from a site). Since each correct process stops after the delay 3 * D * 6 (II is the 
diameter of the graph) and sends at most m messages per 6 time units, for each 
accepted message, an upper bound of the total number of exchanged messages is 
3*D*mD. 
The time complexity is obviously 3 * D * 8. 
3. The mutual exclusion problem with faulty processes 
3.1. Preliminaries 
Let G,, 1~ i < n be processes. Assume that every G, can directly exchange 
messages with every other G,, that communications are asynchronous and that, 
whenever a process Gi sends a message to G,, the message eventually reaches G,. 
Each G, executes a program, that has a section of code, called its critical section. 
When one process is executing in its critical section, no other process is allowed to 
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execute in its own critical section. The critical section problem is to design a protocol 
Pi, which Gi may use to cooperate. The protocol P, involves exchanging messages 
with other G,‘s, deciding when to enter the critical section and when to wait for 
entering it. As long as G, computes according to Pi, it is called correct. Once a 
process Gi deviates from Pi, it becomes faulty and is considered to remain faulty, 
even if, later on, it reverts back to following Pi. Pi also includes the code that Gi 
executes to request permission to enter its critical section. The section of code 
implementing this request is called the entry section. The critical section is followed 
by an exit section. The remaining code is the remainder section, that can be divided 
into two parts. 
A solution to the mutual exclusion problem must satisfy three requirements: 
(i) Mutual exclusion. If process Gi is executing in its critical section, no other 
process can be executing in its own critical section. 
(ii) Progress. If no process is executing in its critical section and there exists 
some process that wishes to enter its critical section, it cannot be delayed by processes 
executing forever in their remainder sections. 
(iii) Bounded waiting. Once all processes are aware of the intention of a process 
G to enter its critical section, there must exist a bound on the number of times that 
other processes are allowed to enter their critical section before G’s request is granted. 
We make the important assumption that the entry and exit sections are always 
correctly executed, and that a process never crashes in its critical section. In any 
other part of its protocol, a process can become faulty. Even after becoming faulty, 
it correctly executes its critical and exit sections. Such a faulty process is called a 
locally faulty process. 
The underlying idea to practically implement this assumption is that each G, must 
be a process executing under control of the operating system of an host computer. 
The critical section is implemented as a separate segment, in its own memory 
locations. For executing this segment, a process must necessarily know its address 
(for instance own a capability for the segment). In the sequel, we will drop these 
implementation details and keep in mind that the three sections are always correctly 
executed. 
We will also suppose that the distributed system has a public key cryptographic 
system, yielding digital signatures [lo]. We note ai the digital signature of the 
process G, and vi(m) a signed message. All messages will be implicitly signed by 
the sender, so that we will always omit a; and simply write m for a signed message. 
3.2. The protocol 
The solution that we will present uses some data structures and primitives, that 
will be part of each protocol (thus, variables are local to a site, but some are also 
global to procedures on a same site). They are given in Appendix B. The solution 
consists in a main program and two interrupt handlers, that are the same for all G,‘s. 
The main program is made of three procedures that are concurrently executed. 
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Program MU~ZUI-~XC~US~O~ ; {for Gi} 
var s: address; 
in : boolean; 
begin 
allocate( critical-section, s); {loads the procedure segment in main memory} 
in := false; {in is local to Gi} 
cobegin 
Listening; 
Byz_cons; 
Local_prog 
coend 
end. 
Local_prog is any specific program that Gi is supposed to execute. The only thing 
that it is assumed about this program is its general structure. 
Program Local_prog; 
procedure critical_section; 
begin 
repeat 
(remainder section 1); 
svc( ask-for-critical-section); 
(remainder section 2) 
forever 
end. 
A FIFO message buffering system is assumed to exist on each site. The procedure 
Listening receives the arriving messages (from the buffering system), implicitly 
checks that they are correctly signed and manages two information tables, ask and 
acq of type control. 
The record ask[j] (of type note) is used to memorize the last message “ask for 
entering” (setting flag to the value true) with its data (the value of counter) and the 
corresponding value I,(s) (coded as an integer). The record acq[ j] is used to 
memorize the date of the last message “exit”. The records ask[j] and acq[j] are 
both local to Gi. The fields flag are initialized to false and date and info to 0. 
It must be noticed that only the last messages “ask for entering” and “exit”, with 
their dates, are saved. We consider only solutions to the problem that use finite 
storage. Thus, since communication is asynchronous, we cannot store all untreated 
messages, because their number is unbounded. 
The procedure Listening treats an inbound message atomically. The text of 
Listening is quite straightforward and we will omit it. 
The procedure byz_cons is used to obtain a consensus among the Gi’s, on the 
particular G, that should be allowed to enter its critical section. It uses as a primitive 
the procedure byzantine-agreement of Rabin [8], that gives the agreement with an 
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expected number of four rounds. As in [8] a correct “dealer” is assumed to provide 
to each Gi an infinite sequence of shadows (in the sense of threshold schemes, cf. 
[5] or [12]) of random bits. The reconstruction of the secret bit, indexed by the 
value of the variable cons_counter, is supposed to be part of byzantine-agreement. 
An important point of Rabin’s technique is that, when a process stops the agreement 
protocol, it has the proof that all correct processes will stop it in the same round 
or one round later. 
The parts of the procedure represented underlined are executed atomically, at 
the local level. 
Procedure byz_cons; {for G;} 
var cons-counter: time-stamp; 
i,j: site; 
ask, acq: control; 
m, result: consensus; 
f: message; 
begin 
repeat 
cons-counter := 1; {cons_counter is local to G,} 
j:= 1; {j is local to G,} 
repeat 
if ask[ j].Jug = false then 
m.value := no-demand 
& begin {G, is wanting to enter} 
m.value := j; 
m.counter := ask[j].dute; 
end; 
byzantine-agreement (cons_counter, m, result); 
cons-counter := cons-counter + 1; 
j := j-t 1 (modulo n); {try for another process} 
until result.value< > no-demand and result.value< >default_value; 
{repeat until a wanting process is chosen} 
if (result, ask[ result].dute) = m and 
ask[ result].date > acq[ result].date 
{no new demand and no exit during execution of byzantineeagreement] 
then 
begin 
send(J shadow,i, result,ask[result].counter),l,,,,,(s)); 
{giving the shadow of the address to the wanting process} 
while ask[result].date > acq[ result].date do nil; {waiting for exit} 
end 
forever 
end; 
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At the end, we present the two interrupt handlers, executed under the control of 
the local operating system. Recall that execution of a svc causes the processor status 
word to be put at the top of the stack. 
Interrupt-handler for svc(ask_for_critical_section); 
var j: site; 
f: message; 
s: address; 
new_psw: psw; 
begin 
while in = true do nil; {G, already made an svc for entering without exiting} 
threshoZd(s, n, t + 1); {each Z,(s) is signed by the local system] 
counter := counter + 1; 
for j := 1 to n do 
begin 
send(J;ask_for_entering, i, j, counter, empty field); 
{fields are signed by the system} 
send(f, shadow, i, j, counter, I,(s)); {fields are signed by the system} 
end; 
wait until arriving of t + 1 answers (shadow, j, i, counter, I,(s)) from t + 1 Gi’s; 
{the signatures over Z,(s) and of G, over (j, i, I,(s), counter) are checked} 
construct s from the Z,(s); {using Lagrange’s interpolation polynomials} 
in := true; 
jump-to(s); {enter the critical section} 
end; 
Interrupt-handler for svc( exit-critical); 
var i,j: site; 
f: message; 
s: address; 
begin 
while in = false do nil; {Gi did not make an SVC for entering} 
aZZocate(critical_section, s); {system primitive} 
for j:= 1 to n do 
begin 
send(f, exit, i, j, counter, empty$eld); {just an acknowledgment} 
end; 
continue; {continues with G,} 
end; 
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Recall that it is assumed that the two interrupt handlers are always correctly 
executed, by any process. 
Theorem 6. If the number of locally byzantine processes does not exceed n/3, then the 
protocol above solves the mutual exclusion problem. 
Proof. The proof is based upon the three following properties of the protocol. 
(a) Mutual exclusion. Assume that two processes Gi and G, are simultaneously 
(for a hypothetical global clock) in their own critical section. Each of them has 
necessarily entered its critical section by an svc, in some fixed order, for instance 
G, first and G, second. In order to build the address of the segment containing its 
critical section, G, has received at least t + 1 shadows &(s). Among those t + 1 
responding processes, at least one is a correct one, G,. Since G, sent I,(s) and G, 
is correct, G, obtained, together with all correct processes, an agreement on Gi. 
Thus, each correct process is executing: 
while ask[i].date > acq[i].date do nil; 
since G, is still in its critical section. 
Consequently, no correct process sent I,(s) to G,. So G, received at most t shadows 
(from incorrect processes) and, contradictory to the hypothesis, is unable to know 
the segment address of its critical section. 
(b) Progress. Assume that G, executes a primitive svc( ask_for_critical_section) 
and let G, be the first process to enter its critical section after this system call. 
Since the only way for a process to enter its critical section is through the Interrupt 
handler for svc(ask_for_critical_section), G, requested to enter its critical section. 
So, Gi cannot be delayed by processes executing forever in their remainder sections. 
(c) Bounded waiting. Assume that the process Gi executes the primitive 
suc(ask_for_critical_section). Since there is no loss of messages, the messages (ask 
for entering,i,j, counter, empty$eld) will eventually reach their destinations. When 
the last of these messages arrives, each correct process G, has: ask[ i].jZag := true. 
With a maximum number of n - 1 executions of the inner loop of byz_cons, allowing 
at most n - 1 processes to enter their critical sections, the agreement is reached on 
(i, ask[i].date). So Gj can enter its critical section after at most n - 1 other distinct 
processes enter their critical sections. 
3.3. Complexity 
The number of exchanged messages necessary for a process that requests to enter 
its critical section has the same order of magnitude than the number of exchanged 
messages necessary for reaching a byzantine agreement and is in O(n’). 
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4. Conclusion 
We have first presented a method for assigning to each site of a network an unique 
identifier. This identifier is a rather long character string and can seem not to be of 
a great practical interest. Nevertheless, there do exist renaming algorithms, that 
allow a reduction in the size of the initial name space, even if some processes are 
faulty [l] and a sequel to this work should be to merge our solution with such an 
algorithm. 
Then, we have given an authenticated solution to the mutual exclusion problem. 
In [13], a methodology is given for deriving non-authenticated algorithms from 
algorithms using digital signatures. This methodology could possibly be applied 
here, giving a non-authenticated algorithm that solves the mutual exclusion problem 
for locally byzantine processes. 
Appendix A 
type message: string of char, 
site: integer; 
const D = . . . ; {diameter of the network} 
6=...; {maximum transmission delay} 
var identljier: string of char; 
valid: set of message; 
procedure timer (delay: integer); 
begin {initializes the watchdog timer to the value delay; at the expiration of the 
delay an interrupt aborts the calling procedure} end; 
procedure send (m: message) to (s: site); 
begin {send the message m onto the communication line numbered s} end; 
Appendix B 
const maxlength = . . . ; {maximum length of a mesage} 
memory_max = . . . ; {range of the primary memory of the host 
computer} 
type bit=0 . . 1; 
site = 1 . . n; {n is the number of sites} 
time-stamp: integer; 
data = packed array [0, maxlength] of bit; 
addr = 1 . . memory_max; 
svc_type = (ask-for-critical section, exit_critical_section); 
{types of system call} 
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consensus_value = (1,2, . . . , n, no- demand, default-value); 
consensus = record 
value: consensus_value; 
counter: time-stamp; 
end; 
message-kind = (ask-for-entering, exit, shadow); 
message = record 
kind: message-kind; 
sender: site; 
destination: site; 
counter: time-stamp; 
info: data 
end; 
note = record {for bookkeeping asks and exitings of critical 
section} 
Jag: boolean; 
date: time-stamp; 
info: data 
end; 
control-array = aray [ 1 . . site] of note; 
procedure wc(var t:svc_type); 
begin {generates an interrupt and a context-switching, causing the process status 
word register to be saved on the stack and an interrupt handler to be executed under 
control of the local operating system} end; 
procedure continue; 
begin {loads the top value of the stack in the processor status word register, including 
the program counter, of the host computer} end; 
procedure allocate (var proc: procedure, s: addr); 
begin {allocates a new memory segment to the procedure proc and returns the base 
address in the variable s} end; 
procedure jump_ to (var s: addr); 
begin {settle the value s in the program counter} end; 
procedure send (f: message); 
begin {transmits the message f to the site jdestination} end; 
procedure threshold (var s: address, t: integer, n: site); 
begin {starting from an address s and two integers n and t, t < n, this primitive 
produces n pieces of information, Z,(s), Z2(s), . . . , Z,,(s), called the shadows of s, 
such that the knowledge of any set of at least t pieces and of no set of strictly less 
than t pieces allows to built s. The n shadows of s are signed by the system executing 
this primitive} end; 
Shamir [12] and Denning [5] give several methods for building this primitive. 
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procedure byzantine agreement (var counter: time-stamp, initiaLvalue, jinal-value: 
consensus); 
begin {reaches a byzantine agreement, by only considering messages that are time- 
stamped by the value counter, with initial_value as initial message. The result of the 
agreement protocol is in jinal_value. The default value chosen for this primitive will 
be the string: “default value”} end; 
Since communications are assumed to be asychronous, this primitive can be imple- 
mented by the probabilistic solution of Rabin [8] or its improved version Toueg 
[ 141. These solutions guarantee exact agreement within a finite expected number of 
rounds, provided the number of incorrect processes does not exceed n/3 (cf. [14]). 
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